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Context as a non-ontological determinant of semantics
Simone Santini and Alexandra Dumitrescu
Escuela Polite´cnica Superior, Universidad Auto´noma de Madrid
Abstract. This paper proposes an alternative to formal annotation for the repre-
sentation of semantics. Drawing on the position of most of last century’s linguis-
tics and interpretation theory, the article argues that meaning is not a property of a
document, but an outcome of a contextualized and situated process of interpreta-
tion. The consequence of this position is that one should not quite try to represent
the meaning of a document (the way formal annotation does), but the context of
the activity of which search is part.
We present some general considerations on the representation and use of the con-
text, and a simple example of a technique to encode the context represented by
the documents collected in the computer in which one is working, and to use
them to direct search. We show preliminary results showing that even this rather
simpleminded context representation can lead to considerable improvements with
respect to commercial search engines.
1 Introduction
To be critical of ontology today is only marginally less dangerous than being a royalist
in Paris in 1793. One doesn’t quite risk one’s neck, but has the feeling that his profes-
sional reputation might end up summarily guillotined. The issue is particularly poignant
here, because this paper will be, essentially, an argument against the use of formal an-
notation (the framework in which ontology is used) and against the current orientation
of the semantic web. Formal annotation is based on the idea that meaning is somehow
contained in a document. This position doesn’t take into account that whatever seman-
tic there might be in a data access (and it is probably not that much) comes from the
interaction of a reader with the document, an interaction that takes place in a context
and using rules determined by the activity of which it is part. Consequently, querying
can be seen as an isolated activity, independent of the substratum on which it takes
place, very much the way it is in structured data bases. But whoever makes enthusiastic
claims about the new “richness” of the data that can be found on the Internet should be
coherent and admit that the very nature of these data will make old concepts (including
the concepts of query and search) obsolete.
We will present an alternative model based on two assumptions: firstly, that the
meaning of a document is given by the change it provokes in the context of the activity
in which it is read; secondly, that these activities can be configured as games, and that
what is usually called a query is but a type of move in these games.
Some people might find the arguments a bit on the philosophical side, but it must be
remembered that semantics is essentially a philosophical issue. The computer scientist
who designs programs for particle accelerators can’t help but coming in touch with a
bit of quantum physics, because that is what particle physics is about. Analogously,
computing scientists who want to work on semantics can’t help but deal with (as Sam
Spade would have put it) the stuff semantics is made of: philosophy.
2 Ontology for the representation of semantics
One solution to the problem of semantic data processing, quite fashionable in the com-
puting milieu these days, entails the formal annotation of the data. Annotating the data
with a formal language serves, in this vision, two purposes: on the one hand, it results in
“semantic” annotation: it records the pure meaning of the data, distilling it from the su-
perstructures and the uncertainties of natural language; on the other hand, being formal,
the language of the annotation allows one to make the same semantic assumptions that
one does in standard data bases, namely that semantics can be formalized using methods
similar to the formal semantics of programming languages. This semantic programme
is based on the assumption that the semantic problems that one faces vis a` vis data are
not due to inherent characteristics of the data themselves, but to the defective way in
which their meaning is carried by the language in which they are expressed. The foun-
dational assumption is that all data have a meaning, which can be derived as a function
of a certain representation of the data themselves. The problem is believed to be sim-
ply that these data are expressed in semiotic systems (from natural language to images
and video) that problematizes the extraction of meaning. (The word “extraction” does
a lot of work here: it provides the epistemological foundation of annotation, namely
that meaning is an inherent quality of the data.) It is assumed, however, that meaning
pre-exists the text (logically, if not chronologically), that can be expressed in a suitable
formal system and associated with the data in a guise that can be understood by an
algorithm.
The nodal points of information systems organized along these lines are the so-
called ontologies, collections of axioms that intend to capture the semantics of the
terms used in a certain domain of discourse and bring teh text that belong to the do-
main within the reach of standard, model-theoretic semantic approaches. Is ontology
the correct way of representing meaning? By posing the problem in these terms one is
begging the question of whether meaning can be represented at all, that is, whether it
can be reified as a property of a document. Ontology says that it can, and that it can be
represented as a collection of axioms on terms and relations. Since relations and their
axioms are an important part of any ontology, an obvious way to start our analysis is to
ask whether they are constitutive of meaning or not, that is, once we have represented a
document by referring its elements to an ontology, whether the meaning resides in the
terms themselves or in their relations.
Let us consider the first option first. This point of view is expressed quite well in
Jerry Fodor’s informational semantics:
Informational semantics denies that “dog” means dog because of the way it
is related to other linguistic expressions [...]. Correspondingly, informational
semantics denies that the concept DOG has its content in virtue of its position
in a network of conceptual relations1.
1 [3], p. 73.
The “correspondingly” here does a lot of work, and requires a fairly important meta-
physical investment since it maps conceptual structures to linguistic ones. This, passim,
is the same investment that ontology requires when it takes a linguistic structure (com-
posed of words and relations) and calls it a conceptual model.
One of the problems of this point of view is that if one holds it as a theory of
meaning, it is very hard to get out of radical nativism. That is, this model leads you
almost automatically to admit that all concepts are innate, and almost none of them is
acquired. This is quite absurd, of course: as Fodor says
[...] how could DOORKNOB be innate? DOORKNOB, of all things!2
Fodor escapes this trap somehow, through the narrow door of assuming that a con-
cept resides in how something strikes us. His way out relies heavily on a cognizant
interpreter (somebody who can, at least, be struck by things), but this way Fodor has a
hard time explaining the deep differences in the creation of concepts between different
languages because it is not clear from it why should it be that the same thing strikes,
say, Italian speakers differently that Japanese ones.
Let us get rid immediately of the idea that “dog” means DOG because of the three
letters of which it is composed. There is absolutely nothing in the sequence /d/, /o/, and
/g/ that is in any way connected to dogness. If you don’t speak Italian, the sequence /c/,
/a/, /n/, and /e/ doesn’t mean anything to you, but to an italian it means more or less the
same thing.
But if the letters themselves do not create any connection between the symbol “dog”
and the meaning of the word, where does this connection come from? What is left of
the symbol once you take away the elements that compose it? Where does its identity
lie? The only way one can save the symbol is to say that its identity derives from its
relations of opposition with the other symbols of the system. Dog is dog not because
of the letters that make it up, but because they allow us to distinguish it from dot, from
hog, from god. We are led, in other words, to a position that might oscillate between
some form of cognitive functionalism [17] and structural semantics [5], depending on
the degree to which we want to rely on logic formulas in order to define meaning. Both
these positions, in spite of their fundamental differences, will agree that the meaning of
a symbol is not in the symbol itself, but in the whole system, and in the relation of the
symbols with the other symbols.
In mathematical terms, one can say that a system of signification must be invariant
to any isomorphic transformation of its terms: if we change dog in hog, hog in bog,
and so on, in such a way that the differences between symbols are maintained, the on-
tology that we get must be exactly equivalent to the original one. An isomorphism of
this type will leave the relations between symbols unchanged so, if we take the second
position outlined above—namely that the relations are constitutive of meaning—we
obtain the necessary invariance. This position also entails that, whenever this relational
invariance is not in force, meaning is not preserved. In other words: any transformations
that is not an isomorphism of the terms of an ontology will not preserve meaning. A
good way to test the plausibility of this assumption is to look at the relations between
2 ibid. p. 123, emphasis in the original.
different languages. One can build many examples that show that languages are, in-
deed, far from isomorphic (a few ones can be found in [14]). Different languages can
characterize the same semantic axis using different oppositions [5] or divide the seman-
tic field using different semantic axes. To the extent that a functional translation from
Chinese to English, or from Hungarian to Quechua is possible, then, we must admit
that a meaning-preserving morphism doesn’t have to be an isomorphism of terms that
preserves relations3. Meaning, in other words, is a more abstract entity than a mere
structural correspondence: depending on the global organization of the semantic field
operated by a language, one can introduce considerable structural distortion and still
end up with documents that can convey the same sense.
There is nothing structurally in the text that can be construed as meaning: meaning
is not a property of the text, but a special kind of relation between the document and
its interpreter. There is no meaning without interpretation, and interpretation is always
contextually and historically situated.
2.1 Ontology as non-contextual meaning
The perspective on meaning given by ontology is very different from the contextual that
is necessary in order to create meaning, and herein lies its main limitation. This limi-
tation goes beyond the use of a specific logic system, and even beyond the limitations
of any conceivable logic system: it derives from the disregard of interpretation as a cre-
ator of meaning and, consequently, from the idea that meaning is a thing rather than a
process. Not only is the idea of formalizing meaning in a set of symbols and relations
between them highly problematic, the very idea that the meaning of a document is in
the document, that it can somehow be attached to the document in such a way that it
can be revealed to a un-contextualized reading, is quite wrong.
An ontology encodes an absolute and immutable meaning of a text4. Where does
it come from? For ontology to work, meaning must exist prior to text and indepen-
dently of the language in which it is expressed. The scheme is pretty much that of a
communication channel.
- - -meaning encode decode meaninglanguage
The origin of the communicative act is a meaning that resides with the author, and
that the author wishes to express in a permanent text [6]. This meaning is a-historical,
immutable, and pre-linguistic. In order to communicate meaning, the author translates
it into the shared code of language, and sends it to the receiver. This translation may
be imperfect; a contingency due to the accidental imperfections of human languages.
3 As a matter of fact, it is not required to be a function at all: the idea of one correct translation
has long disappeared from translation theory [12]. Rather, different translations are possible
depending on the roˆle that the translation will play in the receiving culture.
4 This doesn’t exclude the possibility that different encodings may give different, possibly con-
flicting, accounts of the meaning of a document, among which it may be necessary to negotiate.
But every encoding will give one account of meaning, in absolute terms, that is, independently
of the circumstances of interpretation.
Once meaning is translated into language, it can be delivered to the reader, who can
then proceed to decode it obtaining a reasonable approximation of the original meaning
as intended by the author.
This model of signification is necessary for the ontological enterprise because it is
the only one that allows meaning to be assigned to a text, and recorded in a formal lan-
guage other than the natural language, from which it can be extracted through automatic
means following a schema like this:
- - -meaning encode decode
meaninglanguage
- - -formula algor.
meaningformal system
The conclusions of much of the linguistics and philosophy of language of the XX
century, however, point in a different direction. There can be no meaning before lan-
guage and independent of it: meaning can only exist within the categories and the stric-
tures of language [7]. Not only meaning, but the signifying subject as well are a product
of language [10]; there can be no pre-linguistic signification experience that belongs
only to the author, because meaning can only be expressed in language, and language
is a social construction.
It is the act of reading, contextual and situated, that gives a text its meaning. Read-
ing is not a one-directional activity in which a reader is imbued with meaning; it is a
dialectic process. It is an infinite process through which a frame of reference is created
in which part of the text is interpreted, a text that changes the frame of reference and
leads to a different interpretation of the text, which changes the frame of reference and
so on... This process of framing and interpretation is what reception theorists call the
hermeneutic circle [4, 2].
Lest should you think that all this applies only to literature and not to the prosaic
world in which ontology operates, let us consider an example that is often used in
annotation: a vegetarian pizza is a pizza with no meat. This definition is quite clear
as long as one can give a definition of “meat” (there is also some uncertainty on what
one might consider a pizza, but let us ignore it here). This, in turn, depends in part on
what kind of vegetarian one is: we go from people who eat fish to people who will not
eat any animal product (vegans). If we go by the zoo¨logical definition of meat we are
already in trouble because of the fish.
Then there is the dough. If the pizza was made from frozen dough it will probably
contain saturated animal fats, which are added to make it crisp. Depending on the veg-
etarian, this will also count as meat, so most frozen foods (and therefore pretty much
all restaurant food) will be out of the question. There may actually be in the pizza sub-
stances whose composition is the same as that of some molecule found in vegetables
but that, for reasons of economy, were derived from an animal. Whether that counts as
meat depends a lot on the reason why one is a vegetarian. If one is a vegetarian out of
health reasons, these substances will probably be accepted; if one is as a protest against
cruelty on animals, then the substance will be rejected. We could go on like this pretty
much forever. The point is that in this analysis we have made reference, more than to
the pizza itself, to the vegetarian who will (or won’t) eat it, and to his relations to the
pizza and to the practices of its production. You can’t decide whether a pizza is vege-
tarian unless you do it from the point of view—cultural, social, and ideological—of the
vegetarian: the receiver of the message. Any a priori classification would be a normative
imposition of an ideology; in this case, it would be the seller of the pizza who decides
what counts as vegetarian.
But if the meaning of a text depends so crucially on the context in which it is read,
then the general plan of ontology, to attach meaning to a text so that a simple algo-
rithm can decode is in quite a bit of trouble. The limitations of ontology that we have
highlighted are not a limitation of the particular logic that one might use to implement
it, nor of logic per se: the limitations are at a much more fundamental level. The dis-
cussion in this section problematizes the very possibility of representing meaning as an
attribute of a text. Meaning is not in the text: a text is merely the boundary condition
of a process that depends on the interpreter, his context, the linguistic community of
which the interpreter is part, its discursive practices, etc. This doesn’t necessarily imply
that, for the purpose of meaning formation, the text can’t be usefully represented using
alternative means, including formal ones. As computing scientists, we are interested,
pragmatically, in situations in which reading and interpretation are somehow mediated
by a computer, and alternative representations of the text may favor this mediation.
But in any case, whatever partial representation we have, we can never assume that we
possess a representation of the meaning of the text, one from which meaning can be
extracted in an a-contextual way by an algorithm.
3 Context-based retrieval
In the light of the previous observations, it seems clear that one can’t hope to simply
encode the semantics of a document in manner independent of the hermeneutic act
of reading: meaning is created anew with each interpretation, and is a result of that
operation. Our problems, then, are basically three: given a data access situation, we
must (i) find a suitable context in which the data access is situated, (ii) find ways to
formalize this context, at least to a certain degree (we are, after all, computing scientist,
and we can only work with what we can formalize), and (iii) find ways in which the
context can interact with the data to generate meaning.
Let us start with a fairly general theoretical model. We have said that the context
in which a document is interpreted is essential to determine its meaning, that is, that
the context changes the meaning of a text. We can also see things going in the opposite
direction: the function of the semantics of a text is to change the context of the reader.
If you are interested in literature, the context in which you look at American literature
will not be the same after readingMoby Dick; if you travel on a motorway, your context
will no longer be the same after seeing a speed limit sign. A document that doesn’t
change the context in which you act is, by definition, meaningless. We can express this
situation with the following expression:
C1
µ(t)−→ C2
where C1 and C2 are the contexts of the reader before and after interpreting the text, t
is the text, and µ(t) is its meaning.
This is, as we have said, a very generic model, but we can use it to start answering
some questions. For one thing, is it possible to formalize meaning? The answer of our
model is that it is possible only to the extent that it is possible to formalize context. If
C1 and C2 are formally defined in mathematical terms, then, and only then, it will be
possible to give a formal definition of the function µ(t).
At one extremum, we have the situation in which the context can be completely
formalized. This is the case, for instance, of programming languages: here the context
can be reduced to the state of a computer on which the program is run, and the meaning
of a program to a function that transforms an initial state of the computer to a final one.
In other words, if the text is a program and the context of its interpretation is a computer
system, meaning reduces to the usual denotational semantics of a program.
At the other extremum we have the general semiotic context, which we know can’t
be formalized in symbols, that is, given that a computer is a symbol manipulation ma-
chine, it can’t be formalized in a computer.
The properties of the “space of contexts” depend crucially on the properties of the
representation of the context that we have chosen, and it is therefore difficult to say
something more about meaning is we don’t impose some additional restriction. A rea-
sonable one seems to be that we be capable of measuring the degree by which two
contexts differ by means of an operation ∆(C1, C2) ≥ 0 such that, for each context C,
it is ∆(C,C) = 0. We don’t require, for the time being, that ∆ be a distance. Now the
meaning of a document d in a context C can be defined as the difference that d causes
to C:
µC(d) = ∆(µ(d)(C), C) (1)
Within this theoretical framework we can analyze, at least in the first approximation,
various existing approaches, and devise ways to extend them. In this general scheme,
the ontological approach to meaning can be synthesized as a constant function:
⊥ µ(d) // C (2)
that is, ontology assigns a meaning to a document independently of the context in which
the document is interpreted. This fact results, in our model, in the creation of a constant
context, which depends only on the document and not on what was there before.
A very different point of view is that of emergent semantics [16, 15]: in this ap-
proach, a highly interactive system allows the user and the system to organize the data
in a way that highlights their contextual relations. The meaning of the data emerges
as an epiphenomenon of this interaction. Emergent semantics does not work with one
document at the time, but always with set of documents, since meaning always emerges
from relations. Therefore, the meaning function µ will take as argument a suitable con-
figuration D of documents. The user action is represented as an operator u, and the
schema is the following:
C
µ(D)
**
C ′
u
jj (3)
The context oscillates between C, which is the new contextual situation in which the
user wants to end, and C ′, which is the context proposed by the computer with the
access to the new documents. The semantic function is, in this case, the equilibrium of
the cycle or, in other terms, the least fix-point of the function µ(D) ◦ u.
The model that we have outlined in the previous section entails the demise of search
and querying as identifiable and independent activities. The “death of the query” is the
price that we have to pay for semantics, for if semantics can only be present in the
context of a certain activity, then search can only be conceived as part of that activ-
ity, possibly as something of a very different nature for each different activity. In this
analysis of the transformation of querying we receive some help from the Wittgen-
steinian notion of Sprachspiel (language game). Wittgenstein purposely didn’t define
exactly what a Sprachspiel was, on the ground that the different games are not related
by a fixed set of criteria but by a “family resemblance” [18]. We can say, with a cer-
tain degree of approximation typical of a formalizing discipline like computing science,
that a Sprachspiel is a linguistic activity coo¨rdinated, at least partially, by a number of
norms (some of which are implicit) that determine which language acts (the moves of
the game) are permissible and which are their effects on the context of the game.
From this vantage point, what used to be called a query is not an activity but a type
of move in a computing-linguistic game.
4 Implementing Context
The practical problems posed by the general orientation presented here include how to
capture ongoing activities, how to represent them and, to the extent that it’s possible,
formalize them, in such a way that they can be used as a basis for data access. In general,
of course, this is impossible. If a person is, say, shopping for detergent and wants to
search the internet for brands with certain characteristics, there is very little hope that
we can represent the activity “shopping for detergent” in a computer system: we are in
this case in the presence of a physical activity that leaves no digital trace, so to speak.
On the other hand, a significant number of daily activities are, for many of us, ex-
ecuted on or with the aid of a computer, and they do have a digital trace, one that can
be recorded and used as a context for a language game carried out as part of that ac-
tivity. Suppose that we are preparing a presentation for a conference to which we had
submitted a paper and that, during this process, we need to clarify a point or to look for
an illustration for the presentation. In order to prepare the presentation, we have created
a document in a directory (let us say the directory presentation) where we have pos-
sibly copied some documents that we thought might be useful. This directory is likely
to be placed in a hierarchy as in figure 1. Its sibling directories will contain documents
somehow related to the topic at hand although, probably, not so directly as those that
can be found in the work directory. The siblings of the conference directory (and their
descendants) will contain documents related to my general area of activity, although not
necessarily directly related to the topic of the presentation. This information, suitably
encoded, will constitute the context of the game. In order to create and play it, we have
to specify two things: how to represent the context and how the various moves that the
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Fig. 1. The structure of directories and context for the preparation of a presentation.
game allows will modify it; in particular, in this example, how the query moves of the
game modify it.
4.1 Context representation
In order to build a representation, we consider two types of contexts: the primary context
consists of the directory in which the current activity is taking place; the accessory
context consists of any other directory that contains material in some capacity related
to the current activity. The accessory context contains, in general, the descendants of
the work directory and, possibly, its parent. This choice is somewhat ad hoc, and it is
foreseeable that different systems will choose to use different context policies in order
to determine the accessory context.
In each directory we create first a representation that takes into account only the
files contained therein; we call such representation the generator of the directory. Then,
for each directory, we create a further representation, called the index, built based on
the generator of the directory itself (viz. of the primary context of the activities that take
place there) and of the accessory contexts, as per the specific context policy adopted.
In the above example, in each of the six directories a generator will be created,
with an appropriate representation of the context of that directory (that is to say, a
representation of the documents that appear in the directory). The generators of the
pres directory (the primary context) and of the directories paper, bibliog. and material
(the accessory context), will join using appropriate operators, to form the index of the
context of the search, which is stored in the directory pres. It must be noted that the
construction of the index through generators supposes a hypothesis of compositionality
of the context representation: the representation of the global context of two or more
directories depends only on the representations of the local contexts and the relation
between directories.
Let us begin by considering the construction of a generator, that is, of the context
of a single directory that depends only on the documents found in the directory. In this
example, we represent contexts using a technique similar to that of the semantic map
WEBSOM [9]. This semantic map presents two features that are essential in our case:
the representation of context by means of self-organizing maps in the Euclidean space
of words, and the use of word contexts as a working and learning unit of the map. Note
that we are using the technique in a very different capacity than that for which it was
originally conceived: we do not use it to represent the data space but the context; that
is, its function is not indexing as in [9], but query formation.
The self-organizing map forms a sort of non-linear latent semantic [1] space, and
this non-linearity will is when making changes in the context (e.g. to express a query,
as we shall see shortly).
Many representations of documents use the frequencies of words of the document;
this representation is insufficient for our problem because if we use only a word by
itself, the semantics that derives from the colocation of the words, namely the semantic
component that is needed to solve problems like the polysemy, will be lost. On the other
hand, in the technique that we will use, the fundamental unit of representation that is
extracted from the document is not the word, but a group of words, that is called word
context. The number of words of the word context may vary, in this work we consider
the simplest case: two words, namely, we will consider pairs. Each pair of consecutive
words in the text is seen as a symbol to which we assigns a weight proportional to the
number of times the symbol (in other words, the pair of words) appears in the text (fig.
2 left).
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Fig. 2. The geometry of the words context.
These pairs are represented in the typical geometric space of many information
retrieval systems, a space in which each word is an axis. Since our basis are the contexts,
the points in this space are not points in one of the axes (as in the case of simple words:
each point is a word with its weight), but points in two-dimensional sub-spaces: each
pair is a point in the plane represented by the two words that compose it. Using more
complex contexts will result in points contained in spaces of higher dimension. As
customary, before considering the words for the construction of indices, we will perform
stop-word removal and stemming.
The index is a union of the generators of the primary and accessory contexts. In the
case of our reference activity, the accessory context is composed of the descendants and
the parent of the work directory. The weight of the pair constitute by the word number i
and word number j (in other words, the word pair who has values in the ei and ej axes
of the space of words), which may appear in several directories of the work context, is
ωij . Each generator that we use in order to compute the context has its own weight for
the pair, assigned depending on the frequency of that pair in the local directory. Let ωijP
be the weight for the pair i, j in the primary context folder, Sk be the kth directory that
composes the accessory context (k = 1, . . . , S), and ωijk the weight in that directory.
Then the weight of the pair i, j in the context, ωij is given by the weighted linear
combination:
ωij = γωijP +
1− γ
S
∑
k
ωijk (4)
where γ is a constant, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
The map consists of a matrix of N ×M neurons, each neuron being a vector in
the word space;if the context is composed of T words, the neuron µ, ν (1 ≤ µ ≤ N ,
1 ≤ ν ≤M ) is a vector
[µν] = (u1µν , . . . , u
T
µν) (5)
The map learning is being developed under the stimulus of a set of points in input space,
each point representing a pair of words (word context). Given a total number of P pairs,
and given that pair number k consists of the words number i and j, the corresponding
point in the input space is given by
pk = (
i︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , ωij , 0, . . . , ωij︸ ︷︷ ︸
j
, 0, . . . , 0) (6)
where ωij is the weight of the pair of words determined as in (4). During learning the pk
vectors are presented several times to the map. We call event the presentation of a vector
pk, and iteration the presentation of all vectors. Learning consists of several iterations.
An event in which the vector pk is presented entails the following operations:
i) Identify the “winning” neuron, in other words the neuron that is closer to the vector
pk:
[∗] = min
[µν]
T∑
j=1
(pjku
j
µν)
2 (7)
ii) The winning neuron, [∗], and a certain number of neurons in its “neighborhood” are
moving toward the pk point an amount that depends on the distance between the
neuron and the winner one and the number of iterations that have been performed
so far. For it, we define the distance between the neurons of the map as:
‖[µν]− [µ′ν′]‖ = |µ− µ′|+ |ν + ν′|, (8)
for t = 0, 1, . . . the counter of the iterations of the learning. We define a function
of environment h(t, n) such that
∀t, n ≥ 0 0 ≤ h(t, n) ≤ 1, h(t, 0) = 1
h(t, n) ≥ h(t, n+ 1)
h(t, n) ≥ h(t+ 1, n)
(9)
and a coefficient of learning α(t) such that
∀t ≥ 0, 0 ≤ α(t) ≤ 1, α(t) ≥ α(t+ 1) (10)
Then each neuron [µν] of the map moves toward the point pk according to the
learning equation
[µν]← [µν] + α(t)h(t, ‖[∗]− [µν]‖)(pk − [µν]) (11)
The function h generically corresponds to an environment of the winning neuron
that is done smaller as it increases the number of iterations. In this work the environment
function is the Gaussian h(t, n) = exp(−n2/σ(t)2), con σ(t) ≥ σ(t+ 1) > 0.
At the end of the learning process the map is laid out in the space of a word in a
way that, in the extreme case of an infinite number of neurons that form a continuum,
it optimally approximates the distribution of the points in the space [13]. This map rep-
resents the semantic space of the context and, as we mentioned in the previous section,
can be assimilated to a nonlinear form of latent semantics.
4.2 The query
In its most complete and general form, the procedure of a query is composed of four
phases:
i) through an appropriate user interface or with a program that the user is using, an
initial specification of the query is collected, we will name it the proto-query. The
proto-query can be formed by a few words typed by the user, a paragraph that
the user is editing, etc.. In a multimedia system the proto-query also contain an
indication of the type of the document that’s being searched (text, image, video,
etc.)..
ii) The proto-query is used to change the current context, transforming it into a objec-
tive context. In practice, the configuration of the map (index) of the current directory
is modified through a partial learning, which will give the context a bias towards
the proto-query. The resulting configuration from this learning could be considered,
in some way, as the interpretation of the proto-query in the actual context.
iii) The difference between the actual and objective context is the differential context
and, in our model of semantics, corresponds to the semantic of the ideal document
that is searched for: the document that is assimilated to the current context, will
transform it into the objective context. An opportune codification of the ideal doc-
ument is created and sent to the search server to retrieve the documents that more
respond to that profile.
iv) The documents elected (e.g. read or downloaded) become part of the context: a new
learning is run so that the current context reflects the new situation.
This general model of a query assumes the existence of a search service (search
engine) capable of managing them. The construction of such a service is one of future
goals of our work. For the moment, our objective is to demonstrate the role played by
the context using it to focus searches on existing services. Therefore, it is necessary to
transform the differential context into a list of words with weights, because the search
services only accepts (if accepts) this type of queries. Obviously this type of query can
not make an optimal use of the possibilities of context but, we repeat it, at this moment
our goal is simply to evaluate the influence of the use of the context in the search.
In our tests, the proto-query P is a set of keywords ui. A keyword that correspond
to the i word of the space is represented as the vector ei = (
i︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0). For
simplicity we assume that every word in the query has the same weight wi. Therefore,
the query Q, formed by q words, will be represented as a point in the T -dimensional
space: Q = w
∑q
ui∈P ei
This vector is used for a partial learning process using the algorithm presented.
During this process the neuron [µν] is moved to the position [µ′ν′]. The differential
context is given by the differences of the neurons positions, δµν = [µ′ν′] − [µν] for
each [µν] in a neighborhood of the winning neuron (the closest neuron to the vectorQ).
Projecting the vector δµν on the axes of the words, we get the weights of the words
given by this neuron: δµν = (v1µν , . . . , v
T
µν). The non-normalized weight of the word i
is given by the sum of their weights relative to all the neurons in a neighborhood A of
the winning neuron
V i =
∑
[µν]∈A
viµν (12)
Considering only the K words with greater weights, and normalizing the vector of
weights for these words we obtain the query that will be send to the search engine,
composed of a set of words each one associated with a weight.
* * *
Testing fully the context approach is quite problematic at this time for lack of a
proper contextual server and its data base infrastructure. In order to obtain some pre-
liminary indications, we used the limited weighting capabilities offered by the google
commercial search engine (www.google.com). The contextual query was translated in
a collection of weighted terms, and weighting was roughly approximated through po-
sitioning and repetition in the search engine query. As context, we considered, for the
example reported here, the directory structure in the computer of one of us (Santini),
and as working directory a directory with several columns by that author for the mag-
azine IEEE Computer. We queried the search engine with 32 query terms, with and
without the context, and measure the fraction of the first n documents that were con-
sidered relevant, for 1 ≤ n ≤ 8. Given the generic and varied nature of the columns
contained in the directory, a document was considered relevant if it was about comput-
ing. Note that the measure adopted here is the precision of the result. Not having a fixed
corpus of documents in which we searched (or, rather, being the corpus the whole data
base of the search engine) we couldn’t measure recall. The results are shown in fig. 4.2
It is evident even without a detailed analysis that the difference is large and statistically
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Fig. 3. Precision of the results, with and without context.
significant. Qualitatively, the difference depends on the particular query that is being
made. Very technical words, whose semantic span is very limited to begin with, benefit
little from the context, and fetch basically the same results with or without it. A query
word such as “algorithm”, for instance, is quite unlikely to fetch documents not related
to computing, regardless of the presence of context. Even in these cases, with the use of
context, there seemed to be a better “focus” of the results fetched around topics related
to the columns, but we have devised to way to quantify this effect. On the opposite side,
queries with ambiguous terms, such as “sort” (data sort in computing, an approxima-
tion of qualities in the common language) gave the most dramatic improvements when
context was used.
5 Words of parting
We have argued that formal annotation, and the general ontological programme that
comes with it, might not be the proper way to consider the problem of the meaning of
the document and, in general, to frame the issues related to semantics. This is not a
majority opinion, not by a long shot, and there are a few reasons that contribute to its
unpopularity and to the exclusivity of the attention given to annotation and ontology.
First, there is the pull of certain common sense philosophy. We can look at texts,
read them, and make sense of them, and it seems natural to interpret this act as unlocking
the meaning that is in the text. After all, if we don’t know which gate does flight 354
to New York leave from, and we read the announcement board of the airport, we end
up knowing it. It is easy to model this situation as a transfer of a specific information
(viz. that the flight leaves from gate C34) from the announcement board to the reader.
The error is the failure to recognize that the model can be construed to approximately
work only in a limit case like this one, namely a case in which the external context is
so constraining that the appearance of the symbol “C34” can basically have only one
interpretation, and to extend the same model to the common situation, the one in which
the interpretation context plays a much more important roˆle. We have given arguments
why this position represents a gross philosophical simplification, and we believe that it
will ultimately result in the sterility of semantic computing.
Second, there is the understandable inertia of an established position on which a
considerable intellectual and financial investment has been made. The agencies and
companies that have invested in annotation and ontology are obviously more eager to
see their approach produce results than in exploring alternatives. This phenomenon is
quite well understood in the modern epistemological literature [8].
Finally, there is a point related to the economy of the commercial web (which, un-
like ten years ago, today represents the vast majority of the web today). The model of
meaning assumed by the semantic web is very appealing to web companies because,
if meaning is inherent in a text, it can be owned, bought, and sold like other goods.
Lyotard, in 1979, observed a similar phenomenon regarding knowledge: “knowledge is
and will be produced in order to be sold, is and will be consumed in order to be valued
in production: in both cases, in order to be exchanged”5. Lyotard considers this phe-
nomenon as a natural consequence of the computerization of knowledge: “[knowledge]
can go through the new channels [(those of informatics)] and become operational only
if it can be traduced in amount of information”6. It is not too daring, then, to expect
that a similar change will occur with respect to meaning once this has been codified in
formal annotations: only meaning that can be codified will survive, and this will do so
only in order to be exchanged as merchandise.
In the ontology view, meaning is a property of the author (or of the organizations
that bought it from the author), a property that can be exchanged with the reader using
the currency of language. Among other things, this “market” view of meaning opens the
logical possibility of copyrighting meaning, patenting meaning, and in general posing
commercial restrictions to the free exchange of meaning. For those of us who believe
that the web should be a common good, in which commercial interests should never
replace the free exchange of ideas, this is not an appealing perspective.
Technically, this paper has presented the outline of a different model of meaning,
one in which the reader’s context plays a preponderant roˆle. We have presented a simple
framework in which we are currently experimenting with this model, a framework that
in the future will be extended in different directions: on the one hand, the integration in
this framework of more formal representations, at least for those parts of the context that
can be formalized; on the other hand, the development of suitable data base techniques
to make this kind of query efficient.
5 [11], p. 14, our translation.
6 ibid. p. 13
Our purpose will be, on the one hand, to build a context-based data access client
(configured as a plug-in to some word processing or presentation program, if possible)
to make context based retrieval on general web sites and repositories and, on the other
hand, to build a context-based access server. The latter will be akin to the servers built
for search engines such as yahoo or google but, while these servers do not coo¨perate
with the user’s computer (apart from the elementary communication necessary to re-
trieve the query and return the results), the server that we consider here will be inte-
grated with the user’s computer from which it will derive the current context, and with
which it will coo¨perate to support interaction.
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